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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
POLLAK, District Judge. 
 
This appeal from a decision of the District Court for the 
District of New Jersey presents the question whether the 
second of two closely related diversity suits brought against 
the same defendant may be maintained. The answer to that 
question turns on what, if any, collateral consequences flow 
from the fact that, in the first suit, the district court denied 
plaintiff's motion to join, as additional parties plaintiff, the 
individual and the corporation that subsequently initiated 
the second suit. Relying both on res judicata principles and 
on New Jersey's entire controversy doctrine, the defendant 
moved to dismiss the second suit. The district court found 
the entire controversy doctrine inapplicable, but concluded 
that res judicata principles were applicable and mandated 
dismissal. Our review of the procedural history of these 
linked cases yields the following conclusions: we agree with 
the district court's entire controversy analysis but disagree 
with its res judicata analysis; accordingly, we reverse the 
district court's judgment dismissing the second suit. 
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I. 
 
In order to explicate the issues posed by this appeal it 
will be necessary to examine the procedural history of these 
two suits in some detail. Plaintiff-appellants in the case at 
bar -- the second of the two suits -- are Ralph Venuto and 
Automotive Management Systems, Inc. ("AMS"). Venuto is 
sole shareholder and president of Lightning Lube, Inc. 
("Lube"), a franchisor of quick-oil-change businesses. 
Venuto is also sole shareholder and president of AMS. AMS 
operated some of Lube's franchises, and both AMS and 
Venuto obtained sites for Lube's other franchisees, acting 
as either landlord or loan guarantor.1  Defendant-appellee in 
the case at bar is Witco Corporation, Lube's motor oil 
supplier. 
 
In 1987, Lube brought a diversity suit ("Lube I") in federal 
court in New Jersey against Witco.2 The dispute now before 
this court had its origins in 1988, when Lube moved to 
amend its Lube I complaint by, among other changes, 
adding Venuto and AMS as additional plaintiffs. Witco 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. According to the original complaint in the case at bar, AMS is Lube's 
parent, with the two corporations sharing a principal place of business. 
The first amended complaint, however, (1) makes no mention of an AMS- 
Lube parent-subsidiary relationship, and (2) states that AMS's principal 
place of business is Venuto's residence. 
 
2. The gravamen of Lube's claim in Lube I was that Witco, acting through 
a division (Kendall Refining Co.), had attempted to destroy Lube. On 
appeal, this court, speaking through Judge Greenberg, described that 
case as follows: 
 
Lightning Lube accused Witco of breaching its supply agreement 
and destroying Lightning Lube's relationship with its franchisees to 
benefit a competing quick-lube business that Witco had started with 
Avis Services, Inc. (Avis). Witco's actions allegedly caused Lighting 
Lube's existing franchisees either to abandon it or to hold back 
payment of royalty fees and resulted in large numbers of prospective 
franchisees never opening Lightning Lube centers. As a result, 
Lightning Lube lacked the cash flow necessary to continue operating 
and its owner, Ralph Venuto, was forced to sell its assets to another 
company for far less than their true worth. 
 
Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153, 1161 (3d Cir. 1993). In 
that suit, Venuto and AMS were joined by Witco as third-party 
defendants. 
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opposed the motion to amend, arguing that the motion was 
filed over two months after the deadline for amending the 
pleadings had passed and that the additional claims would 
greatly prolong discovery. 
 
At a hearing on the motion, the parties and then- 
Magistrate Judge Simandle,3 who was overseeing pretrial 
proceedings on behalf of Judge Rodriguez, discussed at 
length the consequences of a denial of Lube's motion to 
amend. Lube's then-counsel, Steven M. Kramer, asked 
"What good it is to the judicial system to force me today, 
before I leave the courtroom[,] to take the amended 
complaint, tear it off, put a summons in front of it and file 
it downstairs for a second lawsuit?" App. 306. Witco's then- 
counsel, Benjamin D. Leibowitz, responded shortly 
thereafter, "I'd say, yes, Mr. Kramer, go downstairs and file 
that other complaint," arguing that the addition of the new 
parties would prolong already difficult and protracted 
discovery. App. 309. Mr. Leibowitz later observed that Mr. 
Kramer could "throw rocks in both courts at us, and he's 
not going to lose anything by the other complaint not being 
tied into this action because the claims he's going to make 
there, presumably, would be whatever they are." App. 314. 
Judge Simandle then confirmed that Mr. Leibowitz meant 
what he said: 
 
THE COURT: Now, a moment ago you argued that 
your your [sic] client at this point would prefer at this 
point to defend second [sic] lawsuit. Mr. Kramer could 
go to the office and file on behalf of his client, which 
contains each and every count, and you don't dispute 
that? 
 
MR. LEIBOWITZ: I don't dispute it. 
 
THE COURT: Why would that serve your client's 
interests? Or was that more of a rhetorical argument? 
 
App. 320-21. Mr. Leibowitz's lengthy response included the 
following two statements: 
 
Listen, Mr. Kramer will have the benefit of thefirst 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. In 1992, Judge Simandle became a Judge of the United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey. 
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case and second case, if he losses [sic], he's going to be 
able to go before the jury, looking, res ajudicata, a 
judgment was entered against Kendall Refining 
Company because it did this and here's the complaint. 
Then how much work is he going to have to do? If he 
has a complaint for bad faith, that will make this case. 
It's even more advantageous for Mr. Kramer to get this 




And when we get this case over, Mr. Kramer is either 
going to skate into a second case with a jury award and 
he's going to say, see, here's their bad faith, and it's 
going to reduce a lot of work, or we're going to go in 
there, and he's [sic] going to say, you had nothing then 
and you don't have anything now, and the disposition 
of this case, as it stands now can proceed more 
expeditiously, and will in fact directly affect the 
outcome of that second case. 
 
There's no question that the issues that are subject 
to res ajudicata are going to be res ajudicata in the 
second case. Under the circumstances, what we're 
saying is Mr. Kramer might be well advised. I don't 
know what the statute of limitations is, or if he has a 
statute of limitations problem, to wait for the outcome 
of this case, and the discovery from this case, the 
parties could stipulate to be used in the other case, to 




Judge Simandle later issued a letter opinion and order 
granting the motion to amend in part but denying the 
portion of the motion seeking to add Venuto and AMS as 
plaintiffs. He reasoned that Lube had delayed too long 
without explanation in moving to amend, and that 
introducing additional plaintiffs and claims would unduly 
complicate the case given the amount of discovery already 
completed. The order specifically provided, however, that 
the denial was "without prejudice." Judge Simandle later 
denied Lube's motion for reconsideration. 
 
Shortly thereafter, Venuto and AMS (hereinafter together 
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"Venuto") filed the complaint against Witco in the instant 
case (which we shall call "Lube II"). 4 Lube II was assigned to 
Judge Rodriguez, the judge presiding over Lube I. Judge 
Rodriguez then affirmed Judge Simandle's denial of Lube's 
motion for reconsideration in Lube I, and stayed any action 
in Lube II pending the outcome of Lube I. 
 
Lube went on to win a $61.5 million jury verdict from 
Witco in Lube I, $50 million of which consisted of punitive 
damages. The district court struck the $50 million punitive 
damage award and reduced the compensatory damages 
award to approximately $9.5 million. This court affirmed. 
See Lightning Lube, Inc. v. Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153 (3d Cir. 
1993). 
 
After Lube I was decided on appeal, the district court 
lifted the stay in Lube II for the purpose of allowing Venuto 
to file his first amended complaint and allowing Witco to file 
a motion to dismiss. Witco's motion to dismiss asserted 
that the action was barred by (1) New Jersey's entire 
controversy doctrine and (2) res judicata. Because both 
sides relied on materials outside the pleadings, the court 
treated Witco's motion as a motion for summary judgment 
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. 
 
The district court held that the action was not barred by 
the entire controversy doctrine. The court reasoned that 
Judge Simandle might have "intended to permit the second 
action in light of the defendant's apparent support of a 
second action," thus apparently preserving Venuto's claims 
for purposes of the entire controversy doctrine. 
 
The district court went on to conclude that Lube II was 
nonetheless barred by res judicata -- which we understand 
to mean claim preclusion, as distinct from issue preclusion.5 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Lightning Lube, Inc., was originally a plaintiff in Lube II, but was 
dropped as a party plaintiff in the First Amended Complaint, filed in 
1994. 
 
5. The term "res judicata" has both a broad and a narrow meaning. 
Narrowly, in the sense evidently used by Judge Rodriguez, it refers only 
to claim preclusion. Our use of the term in this opinion likewise relates 
only to the claim preclusion aspect of res judicata doctrine. However, the 
preferred usage of the term encompasses both claim and issue 
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The court determined that Venuto was in privity with 
Lightning Lube, the plaintiff in Lube I. It then compared the 
counts in the Lube II amended complaint with the 
transactions at issue in Lube I, and concluded that they 
were based on the same "cause of action." With these two 
elements, and the uncontested fact that Lube I was decided 
on the merits, the court concluded that Lube II was barred 
by res judicata.6 
 
Venuto now appeals this decision. The district court had 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332; we have 
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the 
district court's application of res judicata rules and the 
entire controversy doctrine is plenary. See Lubrizol Corp. v. 




We turn first to whether the district court properly 
determined that Venuto's claims are barred by res judicata. 
In Lubrizol, this court had occasion to discuss the question 
whether federal or state res judicata law governs successive 
diversity actions, but we declined to decide the issue 
"because our holding would be the same under both federal 
and state law." Lubrizol, 929 F.2d at 963. In this case as 
well, we find that the same result would be arrived at under 
federal and state res judicata law, and therefore we once 
again need not decide the choice of law question.7 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
preclusion. See, e.g., Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 
U.S. 75, 77 n.1 (1984); 18 Wright, Miller & Cooper, Federal Practice and 
Procedure, § 4402, at 8 (1981). Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, is 
not an issue in this case as presented on appeal, but may be an issue 
on remand. See text accompanying note 13, infra. 
 
6. The court also considered and rejected Venuto's argument that Witco 
should be judicially estopped from pleading res judicata because of its 
statements to Judge Simandle at the hearing on Lube's motion to 
amend. The court noted that Witco's counsel had referred to res judicata 
and had observed that "Mr. Kramer might be well advised." The court 
concluded that "[b]ecause there was no misrepresentation by Witco with 
regard to the res judicata defense, it is entitled to assert it." 
 
7. Since Lubrizol, this court has on one occasion applied state res 
judicata law to successive diversity actions. See Collins v. E.I. DuPont de 
 
                                7 
The district court concluded that Witco had established 
the elements necessary for a res judicata defense. We 
assume that the district court's findings were correct. 
Nonetheless, because Judge Simandle expressly preserved 
Venuto's and AMS's claims for a future action through 
denying the motion to amend "without prejudice," we will 
reverse. 
 
Venuto relies on the Restatement (Second) of Judgments 
§ 26, as well as federal and New Jersey case law. The 
Restatement provides as follows: 
 
(1) When any of the following circumstances exists, the 
general rule of § 24 [the Restatement's general rule 
prohibiting claim splitting] does not apply to extinguish 
the claim, and part or all of the claim subsists as a 
possible basis for a second action by the plaintiff 
against the defendant: 
 
(a) The parties have agreed in terms or in effect that 
the plaintiff may split his claim, or the defendant has 
acquiesced therein; or 
 
(b) The court in the first action has expressly reserved 
the plaintiff's right to maintain the second action . . . . 
 
Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 26 (1982). The 
commentary to subsection (1)(b) provides, in relevant part, 
that 
 
[a] determination by the court that its judgment is 
"without prejudice" (or words to that effect) to a second 
action on the omitted part of the claim, expressed in 
the judgment itself, or in the findings of fact, 
conclusions of law, opinion, or similar record, unless 
reversed or set aside, should ordinarily be given effect 
in the second action. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Nemours & Co., 34 F.3d 172, 176 (3d Cir. 1994). This court has also 
applied "the law of the adjudicating state [i.e., the Virgin Islands]" when 
a prior action was brought in the District Court of the Virgin Islands 
under both federal and Virgin Islands law. See Huck ex rel. Sea Air 
Shuttle Corp. v. Dawson, 106 F.3d 45, 48 (3d Cir. 1997), petition for cert. 
filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3755 (U.S. May 1, 1997) (No. 96-1741). But those 
opinions did not discuss the choice of law question, and we therefore 
regard the question as still an open one. 
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Id. § 26 cmt. b.8 
 
Although this court has not previously had occasion to 
address whether, as a matter of federal res judicata law, a 
court's decision to exclude a claim "without prejudice" 
preserves the claim for a second action, several other 
circuits have addressed the issue. Each of these courts has 
permitted the second action. See Guzowski v. Hartman, 849 
F.2d 252, 255 (6th Cir. 1988); Blackwelder v. Millman, 522 
F.2d 766, 773 (4th Cir. 1975); see also King v. Provident 
Life & Accident Insurance Co., 23 F.3d 926, 929 (5th Cir. 
1994) (reversing a res judicata determination when the first 
court had expressly reserved certain claims); Stolberg v. 
Trustees for the State Colleges of Connecticut, 541 F.2d 890, 
893 (2d Cir. 1976) ("If the underlying judgment had 
explicitly provided that [a particular] issue had not been 
litigated and the defendants were not precluded from 
raising it, there would be no question" that res judicata 
would not bar a second suit.); cf. Torres v. Rebarchak, 814 
F.2d 1219, 1225 (7th Cir. 1987) (concluding that Illinois 
would apply the position of the Restatement § 26 when 




8. Professors Wright, Miller, and Cooper share the Restatement view that 
the first court reviewing a claim has at least some power to determine 
the preclusive effects of its judgments: 
 
Despite the general rule that a court cannot dictate preclusion 
consequences at the time of deciding a first action, it should have 
power to narrow the ordinary rules of claim preclusion. A judgment 
that expressly leaves open the opportunity to bring a second action 
on specified parts of the claim or cause of action that was advanced 
in the first action should be effective to forestall preclusion. 
 
18 Wright, Miller, and Cooper, Federal Practice and Procedure, § 4413, at 
106 (1981 & Supp. 1997). 
 
9. The only court of appeals opinion to the contrary that we have 
identified is one that was decided on the basis of state law; moreover, 
the case arose in an unusual procedural setting not present here. In 
Abramson v. Harbor Island Marina, Inc., 816 F.2d 975 (4th Cir. 1987), a 
state court, after a bench trial regarding a lease dispute, had declined to 
award specific performance or damages for out-of-pocket expenses, but 
had awarded the return of the lessee's deposit," `without prejudice to the 
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Witco responds with three arguments why Venuto's 
claims should be barred by res judicata. We think that 
none of these arguments has merit. First, Witco argues that 
permitting Venuto to bring his claims after the motion to 
amend was denied for untimeliness would reward delay. We 
need not fear that applying the Restatement rule will 
reward delay: if a district court concludes that a litigant 
has unduly delayed, it can -- and, presumably, ordinarily 
will -- deny a motion to amend "with prejudice." Here, 
however, despite the untimeliness of the motion, Judge 
Simandle chose to deny the motion "without prejudice." 
 
Witco next argues that the denial of the motion to amend 
was superseded by the final judgment in Lube I. It notes 
especially that "[n]othing about the final judgment in Lube 
I was `without prejudice' to any rights Lube or its privies 
may have had." This argument is also meritless. Witco 
overlooks the established rule that interlocutory orders, 
such as the order denying the motion to amend without 
prejudice, merge into the final judgment. See, e.g., In re 
Westinghouse Securities Litigation, 90 F.3d 696, 706 (3d 
Cir. 1996). In issuing its final judgment, a court need not 
review all of its interlocutory orders and expressly reaffirm 
their continuing vitality. 
 
Finally, Witco argues that Judge Simandle's denial of 
Lube's motion to amend was not an express reservation of 
Venuto's claims, and hence did not fall within the scope of 
§ 26(1)(b) of the Restatement. Witco argues that Judge 
Simandle's use of the term "without prejudice" was only 
intended to preserve Lube's opportunity to move to amend 
its complaint at a later time, if discovery proved to be more 
lengthy than anticipated. This interpretation strains 
credulity. It is highly unlikely that Judge Simandle, after 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
right of either party to sue the other for damages in a Court of law.' " Id. 
at 976. The Fourth Circuit, applying Maryland law, refused to permit a 
second action "where a plaintiff has prayed for damages as part of his 
relief and has attempted to prove his damages at trial and where the 
trial judge has found the proof of some damages insufficient and has 
entered an award of other damages." Id. at 977. Needless to say, Venuto 
has not yet had a trial nor has he been awarded partial damages on his 
claims. 
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denying the motion to amend because the motion was 
untimely and because granting it would unduly delay 
resolution of Lube I, intended to indicate that he would 
entertain a second motion to amend at a later time. Rather, 
it seems clear that Judge Simandle intended to permit 
Venuto and AMS to file their claims in a separate suit, as 
had been discussed at the argument on the motion. 
 
We find the logic of § 26(1)(b) of the Restatement to be 
persuasive. As Professors Wright, Miller, and Cooper have 
reasoned, 
 
An order by the first court that its judgment does not 
preclude a second suit on specified parts of the claim or 
cause of action advanced in the first suit may preserve 
valid grounds of recovery without undue violence to the 
values of res judicata. The express reservation notifies 
the defendant that repose has not yet been achieved. 
The plaintiff may have a substantially better 
opportunity to prove the reserved claim, or to determine 
that it is not worth litigating. For that matter, the 
defendant may also prove better able to meet the 
unexpected theory in a second suit. 
 
18 Wright, Miller, and Cooper, Federal Practice and 
Procedure, § 4413, at 107 (1981). 
 
In finding that logic applicable to the case at bar, we note 
that this is not an instance in which the court's use of the 
phrase "without prejudice" was inadvertent. Compare 
Hulmes v. Honda Motor Co., Ltd., 924 F. Supp. 673 (D.N.J. 
1996) (refusing to find a second action barred by the entire 
controversy doctrine, although a prior action had been 
dismissed "with prejudice," in part because the phrase had 
been used inadvertently). Judge Simandle and Witco's 
counsel explicitly discussed the possibility of a second 
action, and Witco's counsel stated that "Mr. Kramer will 
have the benefit of the first case and second case" and "he 
can throw rocks in both courts at us." In these 
circumstances, Judge Simandle appropriately exercised his 
discretion to permit Venuto to file a second action. We 
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conclude that, consonant with the federal cases cited 
above, Venuto's claims are not barred by res judicata.10 
 
We reach the same result applying state law. To the 
extent that New Jersey retains its own res judicata law, 
separate from the entire controversy doctrine,11 it likewise 
allows a second suit to be brought on a claim if thefirst 
court dismissed the claim "without prejudice." In 
Woodward-Clyde Consultants v. Chemical and Pollution 
Sciences, Inc., 523 A.2d 131 (N.J. 1987), the New Jersey 
Supreme Court held that a dismissal of a counterclaim was 
without prejudice, and therefore assertion in a second suit 
of the claim put forward in the dismissed counterclaim was 
not precluded by the entire controversy doctrine. The court 
introduced its analysis as follows: 
 
A dismissal without prejudice is not an adjudication on 
the merits and does not bar reinstitution of the same 
claim in a later action. Malhame v. Borough of 
Demarest, 415 A.2d 358 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
1980) (quoting Christiansen v. Christiansen, 134 A.2d 
14 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1957). Plaintiff contends, 
however, that the institution of a subsequent action 
violates the entire controversy doctrine. We disagree. 
 
523 A.2d at 135 (citations edited). One of the cases cited, 
Christiansen v. Christiansen, involved a dismissal of one 
claim from an earlier action "without prejudice," and an 
argument that this claim was barred in a second action 
because of res judicata. The Christiansen court stated that 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
10. Because we rely on § 26(1)(b) of the Restatement, and on cases 
applying its logic, we need not determine whether the statements of 
Witco's counsel at the Lube I hearing on the motion to amend the 
complaint constitute acquiescence under § 26(1)(a) of the Restatement. 
 
11. As we noted in Lubrizol, 929 F.2d at 965, New Jersey appears to 
retain a res judicata doctrine apart from the entire controversy doctrine. 
See Culver v. Insurance Company of North America, 559 A.2d 400, 
404-06 (N.J. 1989) (explicating res judicata law). The New Jersey 
Supreme Court has noted, however, that the entire controversy doctrine 
"attempts to avoid the delay, waste and expense of fragmented litigation" 
and that "[t]o this extent, the entire controversy doctrine is wholly 
consistent with the doctrine of res judicata." Id. at 406. 
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[a] dismissal without prejudice is comparable to a 
nonsuit under the former practice at law. It adjudicates 
nothing. Another action may be instituted and the 
same facts urged either alone or in company with 
others as the basis of a claim for relief. 
 
134 A.2d at 18 (citations omitted). The Christiansen court 
therefore concluded that the claim was not barred by res 
judicata. 
 
It therefore seems plain that New Jersey courts recognize 
that a dismissal of a claim without prejudice removes the 
claim from a res judicata bar. Because both New Jersey 
and federal law are in agreement that res judicata should 
not bar Venuto's suit, the district court's ruling on this 




Witco argues that, even if this court concludes that the 
district court erred on the res judicata issue, it should 
nonetheless affirm on the basis that Venuto's claims were 
barred by the entire controversy doctrine.12 The entire 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. We note that the considerations that would argue for the application 
of federal res judicata law in successive diversity actions would appear 
to argue with equal force that the entire controversy doctrine -- a 
creature of state law -- should not be held applicable in successive 
diversity suits. However, as already noted, this court has not yet had 
occasion to decide whether federal or state res judicata law applies in 
such situations. See in this connection Judge Irenas's thoughtful opinion 
in Fioriglio v. City of Atlantic City, -- F. Supp. --, 1997 WL 249234 
(D.N.J. May 6, 1997). 
 
The New Jersey Supreme Court appears to have held that federal res 
judicata law governs a second court's actions when the first action was 
brought in federal court, see Watkins v. Resorts Int'l Hotel and Casino, 
Inc.. 591 A.2d 592. 598 (N.J. 1991) ("the preclusive effect of the 
judgment is a function of the procedures of the federal court that 
rendered it"); in Watkins, however, thefirst action had been a federal- 
question and not a diversity action. The New Jersey court has also 
stressed that New Jersey courts' application of the entire controversy 
doctrine to bar a state court action after a previous suit was brought in 
federal court is not binding on federal courts, stating that "our threshold 
is not a barrier elsewhere." Mortgagelinq Corp. v. Commonwealth Land 
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controversy doctrine is codified in New Jersey Rule 
Governing Civil Practice 4:30A. The New Jersey Supreme 
Court has recently summarized the doctrine as follows: 
 
The fundamental principle behind the inclusion 
policy of the entire controversy doctrine is that the 
adjudication of a legal controversy should occur in one 
litigation in only one court; accordingly, all parties 
involved in the litigation should at the very least 
present in that proceeding all of their claims and 
defenses that are related to the underlying controversy. 
 
 . . . . 
 
The objectives behind the doctrine are threefold: (1) to 
encourage the comprehensive and conclusive 
determination of a legal controversy; (2) to achieve 
party fairness, including both parties before the court 
as well as prospective parties; and (3) to promote 
judicial economy and efficiency by avoiding fragmented, 
multiple and duplicative litigation. 
 
The doctrine has evolved over time through the 
common law. . . . The doctrine was . . . extended to 
include all affirmative claims that a party might have 
against another party, including counterclaims and 
cross-claims, as well as all parties with a material 
interest in the controversy, i.e., those who can affect or 
be affected by the judicial outcome of the 
controversy. . . . In essence, it is the factual 
circumstances giving rise to the controversy itself, 
rather than a commonality of claims, issues or parties, 
that triggers the requirement of joinder to create a 
cohesive and complete litigation. . . . 
 
 . . . It is for [sic] trial court to determine whether or 
not joinder is appropriate in a given case, and thus 
litigants should be compelled to bring all actions at one 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Title Ins. Co., 662 A.2d 536, 542 (N.J. 1995). See generally Stephen B. 
Burbank, Where's the Beef? The Interjurisdictional Effects of New 
Jersey's Entire Controversy Doctrine, 28 Rutgers L.J. 87 (1996); Rochelle 
Cooper Dreyfuss & Linda J. Silberman, Interjurisdictional Implications of 
the Entire Controversy Doctrine, 28 Rutgers L.J. 123 (1996). 
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time. A trial court is empowered to segregate different 
claims to assure manageability, clarity and fairness. A 
plaintiff who fails to allow the trial court the 
opportunity to supervise the entire controversy risks 
losing the right to bring that claim later. 
 
Mystic Isle Development Corp. v. Perskie & Nehmad, 662 
A.2d 523, 529-30 (1995) (citations omitted); see also 
Rycoline Products, Inc. v. C & W Unlimited, 109 F.3d 883, 
885-86 (3d Cir. 1997) (summarizing the entire controversy 
doctrine). 
 
As noted above in our discussion of res judicata, the New 
Jersey Supreme Court held in Woodward-Clyde that a 
court's dismissal of a claim "without prejudice" authorizes 
a second claim, notwithstanding the entire controversy 
doctrine. However, in Mystic Isle the New Jersey Supreme 
Court somewhat tightened the entire controversy doctrine. 
 
In Mystic Isle, the court held that a second suit against 
four defendants was barred by the entire controversy 
doctrine, even though the first court's dismissal of the first 
suit against one of the four defendants had been "without 
prejudice." The court first distinguished Woodward-Clyde, 
stating that "it is the party's original compliance with the 
doctrine [by presenting all its claims to the trial court], 
rather than the absence of a conclusive determination of a 
claim, that ensures preservation of that claim." 662 A.2d at 
534. 
 
The Mystic Isle court went on to note that 
 
[i]n certain circumstances, especially where a plaintiff 
manipulates the judicial system in order to fragment 
litigation, the principles underlying the entire 
controversy doctrine may mandate that a suit be 
barred even though it stems from the dismissal of a 
prior action without prejudice. 
 
Id. (quoting Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 19 cmt. a 
(1982)). In that case, the plaintiff had "deliberately 
contrived to have one claim dismissed in the [first] action in 
order to circumvent the preclusive effect of the entire 
controversy doctrine on its subsequent . . . claim," id. at 
535; because of this "manipulat[ion] of the judicial system," 
the plaintiff's claim was barred. 
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We do not find the case at bar to be the sort of case that 
should, in the words of Mystic Isle, be"barred even though 
it stems from the dismissal of a prior action without 
prejudice." The major focus of the entire controversy 
doctrine is to bring all claims before the trial court for 
disposition in one proceeding; once all claims are put 
forward, the "trial court has the discretion to structure the 
litigation to assure efficient administration, clarity and 
fairness." Id. at 534. Here, the plaintiff in the first suit 
complied with the dictates of the entire controversy doctrine 
and undertook to present all claims for the court's decision 
on how best to structure the litigation. The court then 
decided -- contrary to the plaintiff's express preference -- 
that the claims should be heard in separate suits; no 
plaintiff "manipulation of the judicial system" occurred. 
Therefore, the ruling of the district court in the present 
case that this second suit is not barred by the entire 




We conclude that Venuto's and AMS's claims against 
Witco are not barred by the claim preclusion aspect of res 
judicata or by the entire controversy doctrine. We note that 
another aspect of res judicata -- namely, issue preclusion 
or collateral estoppel -- may be applicable to some or all of 
Venuto's and AMS's claims (and, conceivably, to some or all 
of Witco's defenses),13 but we leave these matters to the 
district court. The judgment of the district court is reversed 
and the case remanded for further proceedings. 
 
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. Witco's counsel was evidently referring to issue preclusion at the 
hearing on Lube's motion to amend its complaint, when he stated that 
"[t]here's no question that the issues that are subject to res ajudicata are 
going to be res ajudicata in the second case." App. 328. See also Mr. 
Leibowitz's arguments quoted supra at page 5. 
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